Relating commodity prices to underlying inflation: the role of expectations by J. Scott Davis
Insights from the 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
EconomicLetter
VOL. 6,  NO. 14
DECEMBER  2011  
If the central bank loses 
control of inflation 
expectations, a temporary 
increase in headline   
inflation can heighten 
long-run inflation 
 expectations, and an 
otherwise short-lived   
commodity price spike 
 will feed underlying 
core inflation.
T
emporary supply factors may boost some commodity prices—a 
drought in the Midwest can jolt food costs, or a conflict in the 
Middle East might propel oil higher. These, in turn, can increase the overall 
consumer price index (CPI) and the headline inflation rate.
Because central bank anti-inflation measures sometimes take a long 
time to affect prices, policymakers don’t necessarily react to short-term fluc-
tuations in headline inflation (an overall rate that’s not seasonally adjusted). 
In fact, the mandate of many inflation-targeting central banks is to aim to 
keep headline inflation at a certain target or within a certain range “over 
the medium term,” widely recognized as a few years. Thus, even a strict 
inflation-targeting central bank doesn’t aim to contain short-run headline 
inflation fluctuations.
Still, fluctuations in headline inflation due to temporary commodity 
price increases may not be transitory. If a rising headline rate is factored 
into longer-run inflation expectations, temporary commodity surges may 
produce a more permanent increase in underlying core inflation—the 
closely watched rate that excludes categories such as food and energy that 
are subject to wide swings. 
A major development in the theory and practice of central banking 
occurred during the second half of the 20th century: improved under-
standing of inflation expectations and their role in price setting. When 
businesses set prices that will remain fixed for an extended period, they 
must factor in not only input costs today, but also those expected in the 
future. Similarly, when workers sign multiyear labor contracts, they must 
anticipate future costs of living during the life of the agreement.
If the central bank loses control of inflation expectations, a temporary 
increase in headline inflation can heighten long-run inflation expectations, 
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and an otherwise short-lived commodi-
ty price spike will feed underlying core 
inflation. But when inflation expecta-
tions remain anchored, a temporary 
headline inflation fluctuation will not 
feed into the underlying core rate. 
Food or energy price spikes of limited 
duration won’t matter.
Commodity Spikes and Core Inflation 
The post-World War II macroeco-
nomic history of the United States has 
witnessed both phenomena. Chart 1A 
depicts the paths of core and com-
modity price inflation in the U.S. since 
the late 1950s. The Fed lost credibility 
and control of inflation expectations 
during the 1970s. The chart shows 
how core inflation closely trailed com-
modity price inflation in the 1970s, 
particularly after the oil price shocks of 
1973 and 1979. 
It has been widely noted 
that beginning in 1979, under Fed 
Chairman Paul Volcker, the central 
bank regained its lost credibility. Since 
the mid-1980s, core inflation has been 
unresponsive to temporary commod-
ity price fluctuations, which appear to 
revert to the underlying core rate after 
spiking, Chart 1A also shows.
We can quantify the extent to 
which core inflation follows commod-
ity price inflation (or vice versa) by 
examining the relationship of changes 
to each and the gap between them 
(Table 1).1 
In particular, suppose that the 
current rate of commodity price infla-
tion exceeds the core inflation rate by 
1 percentage point (perhaps due to a 
spike in commodity prices). On aver-
age, does a gap of that sort predict 
an increasing core inflation rate over 
the coming months, and if so, by how 
much? If the effect is close to a 1-per-
centage-point increase in the core rate, 
the gap will narrow mainly as a result 
of core inflation catching up to com-
modity price inflation. If the effect is 
close to zero, core inflation tends not 
to respond to commodity price infla-
tion spikes.
At the same time, what effect, on 
average, does the same 1-percentage-
point difference have on the future 
commodity price inflation rate? Does 
the gap predict a decline in the rate of 
commodity price inflation over coming 
periods, and if so, by how much? If 
that effect is close to a 1-percentage-
point decline in the rate of commodity 
price inflation, the gap will narrow 
mainly as a result of commodity price 
inflation reverting to the core inflation 
rate.
The estimates show there is a 
major difference in the relationship 
between commodity price inflation 
and core inflation in the pre- and post-
Volcker Feds. In the 1957–79 period, 
Chart 1
Commodity Price Inflation’s Effect on Core Inflation, 
Inflation Expectations
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the effect of the commodity–core gap 
on subsequent core inflation is posi-
tive and statistically significant, while 
the impact on subsequent commod-
ity price inflation is not significantly 
different from zero. This implies that 
during the 1960s and 1970s, core 
inflation tended to follow commodity 
price inflation, while commodity price 
inflation did not revert to underlying 
core inflation. The estimated effect on 
core inflation implies that if commod-
ity price inflation exceeds core infla-
tion by about 1 percentage point, core 
inflation would be expected to rise by 
a half-percentage point in the next six 
months.
This pattern is reversed in the 
post-1984 period. Now the estimated 
effect of the gap on core inflation is 
not significantly different from zero, 
and the estimated effect on commodity 
price inflation is negative and signifi-
cant. Core inflation is unresponsive 
to fluctuations in commodity price 
inflation, and deviations in commod-
ity price inflation tend to revert to the 
underlying core rate.
Commodity Prices and Expectations
A change in the relationship 
between commodity price fluctuations 
and inflation expectations lies behind 
this abrupt shift in the relationship 
between commodity and core inflation. 
Since commodities are usually 
traded in perfectly competitive mar-
kets—featuring an abundance of buy-
ers and sellers where no single entity 
dominates—prices are very flexible. 
By comparison, prices in the core 
CPI—the headline rate, less volatile 
food and energy components—tend 
not to move as easily, or are “stickier,” 
in economics parlance. Expectations 
of future prices matter when a price is 
set and will remain fixed for a period 
of time. 
Thus, a temporary shock to com-
modity prices can lead to higher infla-
tion expectations, which are incorpo-
rated into the price- and wage-setting 
process. This process is also referred 
to as the “second-round effect.” In the 
first round, the commodity price shock 
causes a temporary increase in head-
line inflation; in the second round, 
inflation expectations can become 
entrenched, and even a temporary 
shock to commodity prices can pro-
duce a persistent increase in the core 
rate.
Commodity price inflation’s 
impact on overall inflation expectations 
determines the strength of the second-
round effects and, consequently, the 
extent to which commodity price fluc-
tuation drives the underlying core rate.
The paths of commodity price 
inflation and one-year-ahead infla-
tion expectations, as calculated by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s 
Livingston Survey, are depicted in 
Chart 1B. As we should expect, the 
path of inflation expectations is simi-
lar to the path of core inflation in the 
chart. Both were high and variable 
in the 1970s, with spikes following 
the 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks, 
and have steadily decreased since the 
mid-1980s.
The plots of commodity price 
inflation and inflation expectations 
seem to suggest that before 1979, a 
commodity price increase led to ris-
ing inflation expectations about a year 
later. Since the mid-1980s, this pat-
tern has no longer held, and inflation 
expectations seem relatively unrespon-
sive to commodity price fluctuations.
It’s possible to quantify the extent 
to which inflation expectations follow 
commodity prices (or vice versa), just 
as we did with respect to core infla-
tion. In this case, imagine that the rate 
of commodity price inflation exceeds 
the current rate of expected inflation 
by 1 percentage point. Does expected 
core inflation subsequently rise, and if 
so, by how much? Or does commodity 
price inflation subsequently fall back 
toward the expected core rate?
If the estimated effect on expected 
inflation is close to 1 percentage point, 
fluctuations in commodity price infla-
tion—even temporary ones—are incor-
porated into inflation expectations. 
If the effect is close to zero, inflation 
expectations are unresponsive to com-
modity price movements.
As before, we can divide the data 
into pre-1979 and post-1984 samples. 
In the pre-1979 data, a 1-percentage-
point excess of commodity price infla-
tion over expected inflation predicts 
a nearly 0.2-percentage-point increase 
in expected inflation over the next 
six months (Table 2).2 Thus, there is 
a tendency for inflation expectations 
to “catch up” with commodity price 
inflation in the earlier sample. At the 
same time, the effect of the gap on 
subsequent commodity price inflation 
doesn’t differ in a statistically signifi-
Table 1
Measuring the Impact of Changes to Commodity 
and Core Inflation
Effect of 1-percentage-point difference between the commodity price inflation rate and 
core inflation rate on subsequent core and commodity price inflation:
1960–79 1984–2007
Change in core inflation rate       0.488*          0.029
Change in commodity inflation rate       0.187         –0.546*
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
NOTES: The effects are estimated from regressions using U.S. Consumer Price Index data sampled at a six-month  
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cant way from zero, implying no ten-
dency for commodity price inflation to 
revert to expected inflation. 
Results from the post-1984 sample 
show the gap still predicts a statistical-
ly significant effect on inflation expec-
tations—so there is still some tendency 
for inflation expectations to catch up 
with commodity price inflation—but 
the size of the effect is much smaller. 
Also, the estimated impact on sub-
sequent commodity price inflation is 
negative and significant, implying that 
fluctuations in commodity price infla-
tion will tend to quickly fall back to 
the underlying expected inflation rate.
These calculations show that 
because of changing expectations, 
core inflation that in the 1970s reacted 
so strongly to fluctuations in commod-
ity price inflation responds very little 
today. In the 1970s, the public was 
quick to change its outlook for future 
inflation in response to temporary 
commodity price shocks. However, 
in more recent decades, expecta-
tions have been largely unresponsive 
to commodity prices. This change is 
particularly significant as workers and 
businesses set prices that reflect not 
only current costs but also those in 
the future. 
Thus, inflation expectations form 
the link between temporary fluctua-
tions in commodity prices and under-
lying core inflation. If the Federal 
Reserve is able to anchor inflation 
expectations and prevent them from 
rising following a commodity price 
shock, it successfully breaks the link 
between commodity prices and core 
inflation.
Davis is a research economist in the Research 
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
 
Notes
1 Standard errors for the regression results are as 
follows: For the effect on core inflation, the standard 
error is 0.099 in the earlier sample and 0.025 in the later 
sample. For the effect on commodity price inflation, the 
standard error is 0.143 in the earlier sample and 0.157 
in the later sample.
2 For the effect on expected inflation, the standard error 
is 0.036 in the earlier sample and 0.026 in the later 
sample. For the effect on commodity price inflation, the 
standard error is 0.108 in the earlier sample and 0.139 
in the later sample.
Table 2
Commodity Inflation Impact on Price Expectations Evolves
Effect of 1-percentage-point difference between the commodity price inflation rate and the 
expected inflation rate on subsequent expected inflation and commodity price inflation:
1960–79 1984–2007
Change in expected inflation rate       0.188*          0.078*
Change in commodity inflation rate       –0.064         –0.489*
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
NOTES: The effects are estimated from regressions using U.S. Consumer Price Index and Livingston Survey data sampled 
at a six-month frequency. Changes in inflation rates are between current rates and rates six months in the future. 